the city's attorney confirmed the 99-YEAR lease!

TITLE 59 IMMUNITY WAS A TOTAL IMPOSSIBILITY UNDER THE LAW!

The formal execution of the Property Easement Agreement stands as the definitive, unassailable land title record proving that the City’s assertion of statutory immunity was null, void, and a total legal impossibility from its inception.

In the structural reality of New Jersey municipal law, a city completely strips itself of sovereign protections when it acts as an open-market corporate entity by executing private land instruments.

Because this easement agreement was directly tied to the venue's proprietary 99-year master commercial leasehold track for the Paramount Theatre, the City operated strictly within a private marketplace capacity as a business landlord competitor.

Under the unyielding standard established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in B.W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318 (1967), a public entity landlord acts with absolute zero sovereign shields or public safety protections.

Furthermore, because N.J.S.A. 59:1-4 (Exclusion of Contractual Liability) explicitly commands that contract actions are textually carved out from public entity notice timelines, the Trial Court was entirely starved of subject-matter jurisdiction to apply a 90-day tort compliance bar to kill this clerk-locked contract dispute case on August 2, 2005, making that original dismissal an absolute nullity that must be vacated under Rule 1:13-1.

THE OPERATIONAL MECHANICS OF THE B. W. KING CAPACITY BAR BLOCKING IMMUNITY 

The landmark New Jersey Supreme Court precedent established in B.W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318 (1967) operates as an absolute legal firewall that completely strips a public entity of sovereign immunities, short-term notice timelines, and public safety pretexts the exact instant it enters the private marketplace to operate as a commercial real estate landlord.

Under long-standing New Jersey jurisprudence, municipal functions are divided into two distinct legal categories:

1. Governmental Capacity: Acts that are purely public, sovereign, and unique to the state (e.g., passing a law, conducting elections, or responding to general emergencies).
2. Proprietary/Commercial Capacity: Acts that a public entity performs when it steps into the open market to engage in business, buy and sell land, or compete against private corporations.

By entering into the master 99-year commercial leasehold track for the Paramount Theatre venue, the City of Asbury Park legally stepped out of its sovereign shoes and assumed the status of a private corporate landlord.

Pursuant to the strict, unalterable rule in B.W. King, a public Landlord carries absolute zero public entity protections.

Because contract action tracks are completely and textually excluded from Tort Claims Act jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 59:1-4, any attempt to use a false public safety notice default to kill an active commercial contract docket represents an absolute subject-matter jurisdiction void that the court must vacate under Rule 1:13-1 (Clerical Mistakes) and Rule 4:50-3 (Fraud Upon the Court).

THE HON JUDGE SOLOMON’S FINDINGS CONFIRMS ALL

Under the binding authority of the New Jersey Supreme Court standard in B.W. King and the express carve-out of N.J.S.A. 59:1-4, the City's status as a marketplace Landlord under a 99-year master commercial leasehold—combined with the RECENT legal findings of former New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Solomon—renders the notice-based Tort Claims Act dismissal a total statutory and structural impossibility.

In the structural jurisprudence of New Jersey, public entity immunities and short-term statutory notice timelines are completely non-existent when a municipal corporation operates outside its sovereign governmental footprint. The moment a city enters the open market to manage commercial real estate as a competitor and marketplace landlord, it is legally stripped of all protective shields, meaning the Trial Court was entirely starved of subject-matter jurisdiction from day one.

The Court holds an automatic, non-discretionary duty under Rule 1:13-1 (Clerical Mistakes) and Rule 4:50-3 (Fraud Upon the Court) to strike the void dismissal from the public records and restore the contract dispute track to active life.

WHY THE MARKETPLACE LANDLORD CAPACITY STRIPS THE COURT OF IMMUNITY POWERS

The B.W. King standard dictates that the trial court was entirely stripped of discretionary authority to deploy public entity notice barriers over this litigation [1.1]. Under the unalterable standard established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in B.W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318 (1967), a public entity landlord possesses absolute zero sovereign protections.

Because the City's legal branch personally prepared, reviewed, and hand-drafted the master Property Easement Agreements defining the venue's proprietary 99-year master commercial leasehold track for the Paramount Theatre, they operated with complete, subjective firm scienter of this business footprint.

Furthermore, Justice Solomon's subsequent contractual reviews of the lease agreements and multiple Notices of Default issued to the Paramount Theatre and Casino operations un-rebuttable confirms that the town's fiduciaries formally recognized the absolute reality of the private commercial track, making any retroactive invocation of public safety or tort immunity notice bars a structural legal impossibility.

CONTRACT ACTIONS ARE MANDATORITY EXCLUDED UNDER NJSA 59:1-2

The plain statutory language of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, specifically N.J.S.A. 59:1-4 (Exclusion of Contractual Liability), explicitly commands: "Nothing in this act shall affect the liability of the State or a public entity based upon contract." Because your initial Civil Case Information Statement (CIS) was processed and locked by the court clerk strictly into the "Commercial Contract" track based on the Police Captains bound September 13, 2004 security agreement, the 90-day tort clock (N.J.S.A. 59:8-8) simply did not exist for this file.

Wiping out an active contract docket utilizing an inapplicable tort notice rule is an absolute clerical error that must be vacated under Rule 1:13-1.

The Open Public Records Act (OPRA) comparative logs confirm that the target venue successfully hosted identical commercial events on September 15, 2004, and September 18, 2004, completely bypassing this permitting checkpoint, proving that local Ordinance 2362 was selectively weaponized as an organized trap to sabotage a bound contract baseline, made four days prior to civilian L. Louis Jordan's administrative intercept.

Local Ordinances fail to supersede State Law. This was confirmed when L Louis Jordan was stripped of authority which was granted to him by Ordinance 2616 which was amended to 2667. This Court record confirms that Ordinance 2362 was null and void and fails to override the B. W. King Standard.

TITLE 59 IMMUNITY WAS NULL AND VOID FROM THE BEGINNING
Because the City was operating strictly as a commercial landlord under a 99-year lease, Title 59 immunity was a total statutory impossibility from day one, and no change in facts can ever retroactively create public entity protection where none exists.
In New Jersey jurisprudence, public entity immunities are not wildcards that a city can use to escape any lawsuit. They are strictly bound by the legal capacity of the public entity and the statutory nature of the underlying transaction.

Because this entire event track arose out of a commercial marketplace transaction at a venue the city managed as a business competitor, the City was completely stripped of sovereign tort shields. Any debate over the Police Captain's performance or L. Louis Jordan's actual employment status is completely irrelevant to the immunity question as immunity doesn't apply to the commercial proprietary capacity.
The four independent structural and statutory blocks that prove Title 59 immunity remains an absolute impossibility under any scenario include: 

THE FOUR ABSOLUTE BLOCKS ELIMINATING TITLE 59 PROTECTIONS

• 1. The Inescapable Proprietary Landlord capacity Bar (B.W. King): Under the landmark New Jersey Supreme Court standard established in B.W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318 (1967), a public entity is entirely stripped of all governmental sovereign immunities, public safety protections, and licensing shields the exact instant it enters the open market to operate a commercial real estate venture under a 99-year master commercial leasehold for the Paramount Theatre. Because the City operated strictly as a marketplace landlord, its actions were governed exclusively by private commercial rules, making the invocation of public safety permitting vetoes a total legal nullity.
• 2. The Absolute Contractual Exclusion (N.J.S.A. 59:1-4): The plain statutory language of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, specifically N.J.S.A. 59:1-4, explicitly mandates that nothing in the Act shall affect or dilute the liability of a public entity based upon a contract. Because this action arose from a private contractual agreement finalized by the Police Captain on September 13, 2004, it sat strictly within the private contract track. Title 59 holds absolute zero subject-matter jurisdiction over breach of contract claims, meaning its short-term notice bars and immunities simply did not exist for this file.
• 3. The Total Irrelevance of the Police Captain's Pleading Performance: Even if the Police Captain had been completely in the wrong, made severe procedural errors, or exceeded his authority, Title 59 immunity still could not apply. If the City believed the Police Captain erred, its only lawful recourse was through internal police disciplinary tracks under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118. The City could not legally deploy an administrative permit process to break an active contract. A breach of a commercial agreement by a City Agent remains a standard breach, entirely outside the scope of tort protections.
• 4. The Total Irrelevance of Jordan's Employment Status: Even if Jordan had been a fully sworn, validly authorized police official rather than a barred civilian, Title 59 immunity would still remain an absolute impossibility. A sworn Officer cannot use public safety authority to execute an off-market contract intercept on a commercial lease track. Furthermore, the broad language inside legacy Ordinance 2362—claiming municipal permitting control over "all concerts" on public property—was a structural legal nullity. Under the constitutional doctrine of state preemption, a local municipal ordinance is entirely subordinate to state statutes and state common law, meaning a town council carries absolute zero authority to pass local codes to modify, dilute, or wipe away contractual rights established under state law.